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I am disappointed by the aggressive tone adopted by Mahomed, 
Nöthling-Slabbert and Pepper in their letter to the editor[1] and in 
their response article.[2] I am also disappointed that they make a 
number of vague allegations against me, such as that I misinterpret 
the issues, and that my conclusions are not reasonable, without 
substantiating these allegations with any specific examples. Suffice 
it to say that there is no merit in these vague allegations. The reader 
is invited to read the original article by Mahomed et al.[3] and my 
critique article,[4] and to be the judge.
In this response, I will briefly address the following main themes: 
(i) the issue of ownership of human biological material; (ii) profit-
sharing by research participants; and (iii) terminology.
The issue of ownership of human 
biological material
Our law provides that human biological material cannot be owned,[5,6] 
with the exception of gametes and embryos in vitro.[7] However, 
Mahomed et al. persist in their argument that there are no firm rules, 
and that each situation will have to be determined on its own facts. 
In support of their argument that there is uncertainty regarding 
ownership of human biological material, Mahomed et al. in their 
response article refer extensively to foreign case law. However, 
cases in foreign jurisdictions do not change South African (SA) 
law, or make SA law uncertain. Accordingly, the argument made 
by Mahomed et al. that there is uncertainty regarding ownership 
of human biological material, and that such uncertainty calls for 
legislative amendment, does not hold water.
Ownership is a species of proprietary rights. In both their 
ori ginal article and their response article, Mahomed et al. use 
the concept ‘proprietary right’ interchangeably with ‘proprietary 
interest’. This is incorrect and confusing, as a ‘right’ is not the same 
as an ‘interest’ in our law. In their original article, Mahomed et al. 
propose the following definition of ‘proprietary rights’: ‘Proprietary 
rights are property rights of an owner of proprietary information 
that may be protected under law.’ In a footnote reference, they 
rely on BusinessDictionary.com as the source of this definition 
of ‘proprietary rights’. The BusinessDictionary.com definition is 
manifestly incorrect. In our law, proprietary rights encompass not 
only rights that have information as object, but a whole array of 
rights that have a patrimonial element, such as personal rights to 
performance in terms of a contract, and real rights in tangible objects.
In their response article, Mahomed et al. express the opinion that 
there is ‘confusion’ among ‘researchers and academics working in the 
field’ regarding ownership of human biological material and a series 
of other legal concepts. The two sources cited for such purported 
‘confusion’ are articles co-authored by inter alia Pepper and Nöthling-
Slabbert on the application of the concept ‘genomic sovereignty’ to 
human biological material. In this context, Pepper and Nöthling-
Slabbert indeed express the opinion that there is confusion in the 
law. However, self-referencing to one’s own opinion regarding the 
state of the law cannot logically be generalised to ‘confusion’ among 
‘researchers and academics working in the field’.
Profit-sharing by research participants
Our law upholds an altruistic paradigm for participation in research 
and outlaws any form of remuneration of the research participant 
over and above reimbursement for reasonable expenses.[8] In their 
original article, Mahomed et al. clearly challenge the altruistic 
paradigm and propose profit-sharing by research participants. For 
instance, they state as follows: ‘This [a proprietary interest vested 
in the research participant] would ensure that the proceeds of any 
therapy developed from the tissues [biological material] would 
be distributed, in part, to the subject [research participant]. A 
mandatory agreement stipulating the terms and conditions of such 
distribution should be required.’ (My emphases.)
I concluded my critique article by suggesting that there is a broad 
array of ethical and legal ramifications that must be considered if the 
altruistic paradigm is to be replaced with a new paradigm of benefit-
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sharing (which includes profit-sharing) by research participants. 
Despite having the opportunity to respond, Mahomed et al. failed to 
address any of these ethical and legal ramifications. In my critique 
article, I also highlighted the absence of a convincing rationale for 
replacing the altruistic paradigm with a paradigm of benefit-sharing. 
Again, despite having the opportunity to respond, Mahomed et al. 
failed to attempt to make a case for the paradigm change that they 
advocate in their original article.
Instead of picking up the gauntlet and defending their proposal of 
profit-sharing, Mahomed et al. attempt to avoid the issue by denying 
that they proposed that the current altruistic paradigm be replaced 
with profit-sharing by research participants. However, paradoxically, 
in the same paragraph of their response article they propose that 
research participants be afforded a ‘proprietary interest’ in the 
human biological material that they contribute to research, in order 
to ensure that the ‘proceeds’ of any therapy that is developed through 
such research would be ‘distributed, in part, to the participants’. 
The distribution of proceeds from commercial research to research 
participants is plainly a mode of profit-sharing, and a clear departure 
from the altruistic paradigm of SA’s current healthcare policy. Yet, 
again paradoxically, Mahomed et al. in their response article maintain 
that it was never their intention to challenge current healthcare 
policy. These self-contradictory avoidance attempts employed by 
Mahomed et al. frustrate proper discourse on the subject.
Lastly, Mahomed et al. still fail to give an accurate representation 
of Truog et al.[9] In their original article, they state that ‘Truog 
et al. have suggested that there are three distinct obligations that 
an investigator who seeks access to tissue might have towards an 
individual whose tissues, upon removal from the body, might have 
value for biomedical research. These include … rights to revenue 
streams.’ (My emphases.) In their response article, Mahomed et 
al. state as follows: ‘The fact that Truog et al. do not specifically 
advocate a profit-sharing model is not a point that the authors 
of the original article were trying to make.’ In fact, Truog et al.[9] 
specifically argue against profit-sharing by research participants. 
The reader is invited to read the comprehensive arguments by 
Truog et al. against profit-sharing.
Terminology
In their original article, Mahomed et al. use the terms ‘donor’ and 
‘subject’. In my critique article, I suggested that the term ‘research 
participant’ is preferable to ‘donor’, given that ‘donor’ has a legal-
technical meaning that implies ownership; in contrast, the term 
‘research participant’ is not shackled by a similar implication, and is 
sufficiently broad to include participation in activities that go beyond 
allowing biological material to be withdrawn and used in research, 
but that are also integral to the research project. In their response 
article, Mahomed et al. appear to adopt my suggestion of rather 
employing the term ‘participant’.
The definition of ‘research participant’ that I proposed in my critique 
article is based on the first edition of the health ethics guidelines[10] by 
the Department of Health. In their response article, Mahomed et al. 
point out that a second edition of the health ethics guidelines[11] has 
since been published, and express the opinion that my reference to 
the first edition’s definition is incorrect. While a second edition of the 
health ethics guidelines has indeed been published, it uses the terms 
‘donor’ and ‘research participant’ interchangeably, and fails to provide 
a definition of ‘research participant’. Given this omission in the 
second edition, I suggest that it is reasonable to rely on the definition 
provided in the first edition, as I did. Accordingly, there is no merit in 
the opinion of Mahomed et al. that my reference to the first edition’s 
definition is ‘incorrect’. They fail to provide any detail as to why they 
take issue with the definition of ‘research participant’ that I proposed.
Conclusion
Social justice in the context of research using human biological 
material is an important contemporary legal-ethical issue. The 
stated purpose of my critique article was to stimulate debate on this 
important issue. Academic discourse on this issue would have been 
assisted had Mahomed et al. in their response article attempted to 
appreciate and answer the main points that I made in my critique 
article. Rather, they attacked my critique article with vague rhetoric 
and contradicted themselves in an attempt to avoid defending 
their proposal of profit-sharing. Furthermore, they persisted with 
legal errors, and relied on self-referencing to aver ‘confusion’ about 
ownership of human biological material where there are in fact well-
established rules. Accordingly, I suggest that the ‘legal conundrum’ 
regarding the ownership of human biological material that Mahomed 
et al. proclaim is sensationalist and not real.
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